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The escape of cultured fish from a marine aquaculture facility is a type of biological invasion 
that may lead to a variety of potential ecological and economic effects on native fish. This 
paper  develops  a general invasive species  impact model to  capture  explicitly  both  the 
ecological and economic effects of invasive species, especially escaped farmed fish, on native 
stocks and harvests. First, the possible effects of escaped farmed fish on the growth and stock 
size of a native fish are examined. Next, a bioeconomic model to analyze changes in yield, 
benefit distribution, and overall profitability is constructed. Different harvesting scenarios, 
such as commercial, recreational, and joint commercial and recreational fishing, are explored. 
The model is illustrated by a case study of the interaction between native and farmed Atlantic 
salmon in Norway. The results suggest that both the harvest and profitability of a native fish 
stock may decline after an invasion, but the total profits from the harvest of both native and 
farmed stocks may increase or decrease, depending on the strength of the ecological and 
economic parameters.  
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During the last few decades, concerns have been increasing about the effects of invasive 
species, especially invasive fish. Invasive species can be introduced intentionally into a new 
environment for recreational or commercial purposes (Williams et al. 1995). In other cases, 
human activities have allowed intruders to become established indirectly. For example, global 
warming causes organisms to migrate to higher latitudes (Carlton 2000), and transportation 
and shipping carries organisms across the oceans (Enserink 1999). Small scale events such as 
wastewater discharges and farming activities may release organisms into the surrounding 
environment.  Regardless of its  origins,  an  invasive  species (including fish)  potentially 
generates risks to and effects on native species, local communities, and ecosystems (Mooney 
and Hobbs 2000). The potential economic effects of invasive species consist of damages to 
economic enterprises, food safety and human health, markets, particularly seafood markets, 
and international trade (Lovell, Stone and Fernandez 2006; Olsen 2006). These economic 
impacts can be severe.  In addition to economic impacts,  invasive  species  also generate 
ecological impacts, including losses to  biodiversity and changes in the structures and 
functions of individual populations and ecosystems (Mooney and Hobbs 2000). Holmes (1998) 
argued that invasive  species  are the second most important cause of biodiversity losses 
worldwide, just after habitat degradation.   
In this paper, we analyze another potential concern associated with invasive fish, namely, the 
ecological and economic impacts on native fish of invasive fish from aquaculture facilities. 
Farmed species are reared in confined facilities in locations that provide suitable conditions 
for growth and are accessible to markets. Due to natural disasters, accidents, or human error, 
farmed animals can escape from their facilities into the surrounding environment, potentially 
creating ecological and economic impacts, especially when there are interactions with native 
fish.  
 
The escaped fish interact with native fish in a variety of ways. Ecologically, they may interact 
through competition, predation, hybridization, colonization, or the  spread of disease  or 
parasites. Ecological interactions may lead to both positive and negative effects on native fish. 
If escaped cultured fish are able to survive in the natural environment, they become part of the 
ecosystem, and they  interact  directly (and indirectly) with  the  native  fish.  For  example, 
escaped farmed salmon compete with native salmon, and escaped farmed cod and halibut 
migrate  to the open ocean to  interact with native habitants,  including their congeners.  
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Competition  over  natural habitat,  food sources, and  mates  may  result in changes in the 
structure and productivity of a native stock (Naylor et al. 2005). In the case of escaped farmed 
salmon, it has been reported that successful interbreeding between escaped farmed and native 
salmon reduces fitness and productivity (McGinnity et al. 2003), dilutes genetic gene pools 
(McGinnity et al. 2004; Roberge et al. 2008), and threatens the survival of native salmon 
offspring (Hindar et al. 2006). Also, escaped farmed salmon may spread disease and parasites, 
thereby increasing the mortality of native salmon (Bjørn and Finstad 2002; Gargan, Tully and 
Poole 2002; Krkošek et al. 2006). If the number of escaped farmed fish is small, the effects 
may be negligible; the effects increase in severity as the number of escaped farmed fish grows. 
Some vulnerable native stocks potentially could go extinct with repeated invasions. Escaped 
farmed fish also can create economic impacts in seafood markets. For example, depending on 
the ecological impact, invasive farmed fish could change (increase or decrease) the overall 
stock (native and escaped farmed) available for harvest. 
In this paper, we develop a general bioeconomic model to capture both the ecological and 
economic effects of invasive farmed fish on native stocks  and  harvests.  The  framework 
discussed here is transferable to other situations where escaped fish mix with their native 
counterparts, or where an ecosystem, for any reason, faces a yearly influx of invasive fish. 
The increasing aquaculture production worldwide of both salmon and other species such as 
cod and halibut highlights the importance of this issue. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a review of the literature on the 
economics of invasive species with an emphasis on aquatic species invasions. In sections 
three and four, we derive the mechanisms of ecological and economic impacts of invasive 
farmed fish on native fish. We first introduce an ecological model of an invasive farmed fish. 
In section four, the flow of service costs and benefits are taken into account. In section five, 
we  analyze the  unified  planning  solution  in equilibrium.  In section  six,  we apply  the 
framework to Atlantic salmon in Norway to illustrate the ecological and economic effects of 
escaped farmed salmon on native salmon stocks and fisheries under different scenarios. The 
last section concludes the paper. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The economic analysis of an invasion includes estimating the actual or potential damage costs 
resulting from an invasion and the costs associated with management measures such as  
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prevention, control,  and  mitigation  (Hoagland and Jin 2006). The economics of pest 
management and disease control have been extensively studied in agriculture, forestry and 
fisheries, but less attention has been directed to measuring the costs associated with invasions 
(Perrings, Williamson, and Dalmazzone 2000). This limitation is due to a lack of data as well 
as uncertainties and measurement problems.  There is an  extensive literature on multiple 
species interactions, such as predator-prey and biological competition, however. For instance, 
Hannesson (1983) has explored the optimal harvesting of a two-species predator-prey system, 
Flaaten (1991) has  investigated the sustainable harvesting  of two competing species, and 
Strobele and Wacker (1991) have  explored the optimal harvesting of two species under 
various types of interactions. A recent  detailed review of  integrated ecological-economic 
models can be found in Tschirhart (2009).  
 
A general conceptual bioeconomic model of the economic impacts of an invasion has been 
developed by Knowler and Barbier (2000) and Barbier (2001). These authors specify two 
principles that should be followed. First, the exact interaction between the invader and the 
native species should be examined, and, second, the correct measure of the economic impacts 
is to compare the ex post and ex ante economic values (i.e., profits) of invasion scenarios. The 
first principle is the  essential step. Their  conceptual model includes both diffusion and 
interspecies  competition. The authors consider a situation in which the invader is  a pest 
without commercial value and the native fish is commercially harvested. Knowler and Barbier 
(2000) illustrate a special case by focusing only on interspecies competition. They model the 
predator-prey relationship between a native anchovy species and an invading comb-jellyfish 
in the Black Sea. The anchovy is the prey for the comb-jelly fish, whose invasion leads to a 
decline in the productivity of anchovy. The study concludes that the introduction of a comb-
jellyfish is destructive to the local fishing communities dependent on the anchovy fishery for 
sustaining their livelihoods. 
 
Knowler, Barbier and Strand (2002) and Knowler and Barbier (2005) apply the predator-prey 
model to examine the interactions among nutrient enrichment, invasive comb-jelly fish, and 
native anchovy in the Black Sea under different management strategies. The anchovy benefits 
from the nutrient abatement, and suffers from competition and predation by comb-jellyfish. 
They show that the outbreak of comb-jellyfish resulting from nutrient enrichment can dilute 
the benefits raised by pollution abatement. Similarly, Settle and Shogren (2002) examine the 
introduction of exotic lake trout into Yellowstone Lake based on predator-prey relationships  
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among lake trout, cutthroat trout, bears, birds, and human beings. The authors find that if the 
invasive lake trout is unchecked, the native cutthroat trout population would dramatically 
decline, even go extinct, which further affects the grizzly bear population. The bioeconomic 
models in these studies are founded on predator-prey  relationships  between  invasive and 
native fish. 
 
Viewed as a form of biological pollution, an invasion generates externalities on economic 
activities such as commercial and recreational fishing. For example, McConnell and Strand 
(1989) analyze the social returns to commercial fisheries when water quality influences the 
demand  and supply of commercial fish products under both open access and efficient 
allocation.  They show theoretically  that water quality affects fish growth through 
reproduction and carrying capacity and affects total fishing costs through changes in fish 
stocks. Following this framework, Kataria (2007) applies a cost-benefit analysis to examine 
the introduction of signal crayfish to a fresh watercourse where native noble crayfish resides. 
The analysis suggests that the introduction of signal crayfish can generate positive net benefits 
if  the  two species have different population growth  parameters.  With  similar  growth 
parameters, on the other hand, the author shows that the introduction of signal crayfish would 
wipe out native noble crayfish because the two species cannot coexist.   
 
In the case of fisheries and aquaculture, however, the literature dealing with the economic 
impacts of farmed fish on native fish is quite limited. Earlier work by Anderson (1985a and 
1985b) addressed the interaction between native  capture and ranched salmon in terms of 
common property problems and competitive markets. Recent work by Olaussen and Skonhoft 
(2008a) studies the economic impacts of escaped farmed Atlantic salmon on a recreational 
salmon fishery. Expanding the models by Knowler and Barbier (2000) and McConnell and 
Strand (1989), they incorporate both ecological and economic effects and specify four general 
mechanisms that may affect economically valuable species (i.e., salmon) when exposed to 
biological invasions, namely, ecological  level,  ecological growth,  economic  quantity,  and 
economic  quality. Ecologically, escaped farmed salmon impose  negative impacts  on the 
growth but lead to positive impacts on the stock of native salmon.  Economically, escaped 
farmed salmon lead to positive impacts on the supply (quantity) of and negative impacts on 




Other studies have explored the economic impacts of aquaculture on native fish species in 
general. For example, Hoagland, Jin, and Kite-Powell (2003)  analyze  the effects of 
aquaculture on native fish species through fish habitat and supply in the product market. They 
assume the carrying capacity of a fish stock is a downward sloping linear function of the area 
devoted to aquaculture, and the farmed product competes in the same market as native fish 
products. The results suggest that the commercial fish stock declines because more space is 
devoted to aquaculture. Under an open-access fishery, it is economically efficient for 
aquaculture to displace the fishery completely. An ocean area could be allocated exclusively 
for either aquaculture or fisheries at an economic optimum  when aquaculture exerts a 
significant negative impact on the fishery.  
 
The ecological-economic model we develop in this paper differs from previous studies in 
several ways. First, we explicitly model the effects of an invasive fish species on the growth 
and stock size of a native fish species using a logistic growth model. We assume that both the 
growth and stock effects on the native fish are negative, and we treat native and farmed fish 
species as separate stocks with separate growth functions.  This approach is in contrast to that 
of Olaussen and Skonhoft (2008a), who regard farmed salmon as a single exogenous flow into 
the system.  Given our simplified biological model, we do not capture explicitly genetic 
interactions between native and escaped fish. Second, in contrast to Knowler, Barbier, and 
Strand (2002) and Knowler and Barbier (2005), we consider the escaped farmed fish as a 
potentially commercially valuable species. Additionally, farmed fish coexist with native fish, 
unlike the crayfish case in which the native fish are displaced (Kataria 2007). A nonselective 
harvesting strategy is applied to both escaped and native fish. Third, instead of using cultured 
area or aquaculture production as dependent variable to alter the carrying capacity (Hoagland, 
Jin, and Kite-Powell 2003), we hold the carrying capacity unchanged, and we use the biomass 
of escaped farmed fish as a deterministic variable to translate the ecological risks and effects 
into growth and stock variables for a native stock. Fourth, we assume that the growth of the 
invasive fish depends upon both own and native fish biomass.  
 
3. BIOLOGICAL MODEL  
In absence of an invasive fish, the natural growth of a native fish population  X , measured in 
biomass, or number of fish, at time t (the time subscript is omitted) is given by () FX. The 
natural growth function may typically be a one-peaked value function and is specified as the 
standard logistic one:  
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( ) (1 / ) F X rX X K = − ,                                                    (1) 
where r  is the intrinsic growth rate and K  is the carrying capacity of a specific habitat, or 
population’s natural equilibrium size. This growth model suggests that the population growth 
depends on the population size, or density, given a specific habitat, and basically combines 
two ecological processes: reproduction and competition. The intrinsic  growth rate  r  
represents reproduction,  or reproductive abilities, while  the  population size per carrying 
capacity  / XK  represents competition since carrying capacity can be  interpreted as  the 
maximum number of fish the habitat can support.  
 
As indicated above,  once established in the natural environment, an  escaped farmed fish 
becomes part of the ecosystem and interacts with a native  fish. Hence, incorporating the 
escaped farmed fish, the growth function changes to (,) FXY , where Y is the stock size of the 
escaped farmed fish , or an invasive fish stock in general, also measured in the number of fish 
(or in biomass). Typically, a larger escaped farmed fish stock means lower natural growth and 
productivity in the native population, i.e.  ( , )/ 0 Y FXY Y F ∂ ∂= < . 
 
This negative growth effect may work through different channels. Based on the  logistic 
growth function, we consider two effects that are represented through the intrinsic growth rate 
and through the carrying capacity.  First,  we consider the stock effect  where  the  classical 
Lotka-Volterra interspecific competition model is modified and employed. This model takes 
into account the effects of intraspecific competition between the two types of fish, i.e., native 
and escaped farmed fish. Here the competition of a escaped farmed fish with a native fish is 
added into the logistic growth model of native fish by the term Y β , with β  as the competition 
coefficient. The same principle is applied to the competition effects of native fish on escaped 
farmed fish, see equation (4) below. Our population growth models use the same carrying 
capacity for the  two  fish, however, which differs from the Lotka-Volterra interspecific 
competition model, where the carrying capacity for the different types of fish generally varies. 
The reason for using the same carrying capacity for the two fish here is that we consider the 
situation where the escaped farmed fish is quite similar to the native and hence makes the 
same use of the habitat as the native fish. This assumption fits well in the case when a 
domesticated fish escapes and competes with its native congeners but is of course less suitable 
if it competes with a quite different species. Technically these approaches work in a similar 
manner as the denominator diminishes  when  altering the carrying capacity while the  
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numerator increases in our model. Strictly speaking, both lead to increasing pressures on the 
survival of native fish due to competition for resources and space. Modifying Eq. (1), we then 
obtain: 
( , ) [1 ( ) / ] F X Y rX X Y K β = −+   .                                     (2) 
When 01 β <≤ , the effect of the escaped farmed fish on the native stock is less than the 
effect of the native stock on itself. On the other hand, when  1 β > , the effect of the escaped 
farmed fish on the native stock is greater than the effect of the native stock on itself.
1 The 
maximum native natural growth is now given by 
2 ( ) /4 rK Y β −   when the stock size at the 
maximum growth (MSY)  is reduced  to  ( )/2
msy XX K Y β = = −.  In  other  words, both the 
maximum growth and the stock size that yields this peak growth are reduced (see Figure1, 
dark dotted curve).  
 
As mentioned above, escaped organisms may interbreed with native individuals, which may 
potentially deteriorate the genetic makeup and reduce the fitness of the native stock. We 
couple this reproductive effect into the intrinsic growth rate, referring to it as a growth effect. 
The intrinsic growth rate is redefined as 
/ ( , ) (1 )
XY r rXY r e
γ − = = −  , where  0 γ >  is a scaling 
parameter representing the magnitude of effects of escaped fish on native fish. This formula 
indicates that the intrinsic growth rate declines with the increasing biomass of the escaped fish 
in a non-linear fashion with  ( ,0) r rX r = =  and  (,)0 r rX = ∞=   for all  0 X > . In addition, we 
have  0 r >   for all 0 Y < <∞. It should be noted that especially in cases where the escaped 
and native fish interbreed, the interbreeding may induce accumulated genetic effects from 
generation to generation. Taking such effects into account would require a more complicated 
model that explicitly takes the gene flow into account, which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
One of the reasons for including a growth effect, however, is that the intrinsic growth rate may 
be reduced due to the influence of genes less suited for a life in the native fish. In fact, in the 
post invasion equilibrium (see Section 5), the intrinsic growth rate r  is reduced due to the 
“hybrid wild” salmon affected by escaped fish. The degree of hybridization is determined by 
the parameter value of γ and the number of escaped farmed fish. However, we assume that 
the wild genotype still dominates this “hybrid” stock, thus, for simplicity we will keep 
                                                 
1 In some cases, escaped fish may have positive effects on native fish when the native stock is so low that it 
cannot sustain its growth, and hence the presence of an escaped fish improves its growth (the ‘Allee effect’ in the 
ecological literature). In this case, the value of β  is negative. This possible case is not considered here.   
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referring to this salmon stock as the wild or native stock, even if there will always be degrees 
of wild and farmed fish in the post invasion case (except when 0 γ = ). 
 
Now, incorporating both the stock and growth effects into the logistic growth function (1), we 
obtain
2:  
/ ( , ) (1 ) [1 ( ) / ]
XY FXY r e X X Y K
γ β
− =− −+ .                     (3) 
Figure 1 demonstrates both the stock and growth effect on the native fish growth. Notice that 
while the stock effect shifts the peak value to the left (dotted curve), the growth effect shifts it 
to the right  (dark solid curve). In both cases the maximum natural growth is reduced. 
Certainly the magnitude of effects depends on the value of β , γ  and Y . The larger β , γ  and 
Y , the stronger the effects.  
 
Insert Figure 1 here 
 
So far, we have assumed that invasive fish in general, and escaped fish in particular, have 
negative ecological effects on native fish (but see footnote 1). However, in some instances the 
effects may be positive. Japanese Seaweed, Sargassum muticum, for example, an invasive 
seaweed species, can enhance local diversity and the ecosystem function. This is because this 
species can provide an additional habitat for bottom species and food for some invertebrates 
and native fish species (Sánchez, Fernández, and Arrontes 2005). Another example is invasive 
zebra mussels which have mixed effects on the environment and native fauna. On the one 
hand, they can improve the water quality and the richness of macro-invertebrates in lakes; on 
the other hand, they foul the underwater structures and devices (Ricciardi 2003). Nevertheless, 
most marine species selected for aquaculture are generally high-value such as salmon, sea 
bass, halibut, and cod. These species are top predators situated at, or near, the top of the food 
chain. Therefore, they rarely become the prey of other commercially exploited species. On the 
other hand, escaped fish are also harvested, and since the escaped fish increase the stock 
available for harvest ceteris paribus, they may also have a positive economic effect. Salmon 
                                                 
2 Thus, as already indicated, for a fixed intrinsic growth rate, our model has the same structure as the basic 
Lotka-Volterra model where the competition loss of our native fish population increases linearly with the amount 
of the invasive fish. This is seen by rewriting the growth function (2) as 
(,) ( 1 /)( /) F X Y rX X K r K XY β = −−  . The invasive fish natural growth equation (4) has similar 
structure (see main text below).  
 
11 
enhancement in Norway, Canada, Japan and the U.S are good examples of this ceteris paribus 
positive economic effect (e.g., Anderson 1985a; see also section two above). 
 
Additionally,  the growth of  escaped  farmed  fish  as  a part of the ecosystem  has to be 
considered as well. Like native fish, escaped fish growth is assumed to be density dependent. 
Moreover, we assume that there is also a feedback effect from the native fish on escaped fish 
similar to the effect of the escaped fish on native fish. Therefore, the growth of escaped fish 
follows a growth function similar to that of the native, specified as:  
 
/ ( , ) (1 ) [1 ( ) / ]
aY X G Y X s e Y Y bX K
− = − −+  .                                     (4) 
 
s is the intrinsic growth rate of farmed species; the carrying capacity is assumed to be the 
same as that for the native fish, since they share the same habitat; aand b are equivalent to 
γ and β in the native fish growth function (Eq. 3), representing the scaling parameter and 
competition coefficient, respectively. In the same manner as for the wild fish discussed above, 
we assume that the farmed genotype controls this salmon stock, thus, we will refer to this 
population as the escaped (farmed) fish, even if there are degrees of hybridization for all 
0 a > .  
 
The stock dynamic models of the native and escaped fish are completed when harvest and the 
flow of newly escaped fish are introduced. If  t h and  t q denote the harvests of the native and 
farmed species at time t, respectively, and  t m is the annual stream of newly escaped fish, the 
stock dynamics of the native and escaped fish are written as: 
1 ( ,) t t tt t X X FXY h + −= −                                                       (5) 
and 
                 1 (, ) t t tt t t Y Y GY X q m + −= −+ ,                                                 (6) 
respectively
3. In an ecological equilibrium, the natural growth of the native fish stock must 
exactly be balanced by its harvest, while the natural growth plus the flow of a newly escaped 
farmed fish should be equal to the harvest of the escaped fish. Thus, in equilibrium, we have 
(,) FXY h =  and  (, ) GY X m q += . Here we study exploitation in ecological equilibrium only. 
                                                 
3 The inclusion of  t m hence means that we have an ecological system with (unintended) species introduction, cf. 
also section 2 above. Contrary to this, e.g., Rondeau (2001) considers a situation with intended species 
introduction, but where the population growth equation (he considers deer) is of the similar type as equation (6).  
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Note that this implies an assumption of a continuous and constant stream of invaders over 
time. This means that the problem of whether the invasive fish should be eradicated at a 
certain point in time or simply controlled at some equilibrium level is not a topic that we 
address here.  
 
4. COSTS AND BENEFITS 
Native fish  provide various values, including direct and indirect use values, and non-use 
values such as option, existence, or intrinsic values. Here we consider only the values directly 
related to the harvesting of native or escaped farmed fish. Thus, within our unified planner 
framework, the objective of the planner is to maximize the net surplus of harvesting both 
native and escaped fish. As already indicated, two types of harvesting activities are considered: 
harvests by commercial fishermen and harvests by recreational anglers. The net benefit of 
commercial harvest is determined by the meat value together with the fishing costs, while the 
net benefit of recreational fishing is determined by the price of fishing permits and the number 
of fishing permits sold, together with the cost of supplying fishing permits.  
 
4.1 Commercial fishing 
The harvest functions are assumed to be of the standard Schaefer type where  t tt h EX θ =  and 
t tt q EY ψ =  are the harvests of native and escaped fish, respectively, with θ  as the (fixed) 
catchability coefficient for native and ψ  for escaped, and  t E  as the effort measured in net 
fishing days (fishing days times number of nets). Note that these specifications imply non-
selectivity in harvest. With identical catchability coefficients, θ =ψ , the harvest will only 
differ due to the different abundance of native and escaped fish, and the harvest ratio will 
always be equal to the stock ratio; that is,  // tt tt hq XY = .  
 
With  0 p >  and  0 v ≥  as the harvest prices of the native and invasive fish, respectively, both 
assumed fixed and independent of the amount fished, and c  is the unit effort cost, also 
assumed to be fixed, the current profit is:   
t t t tt t p E X v EY cE πθ ψ = +− .          (7) 
As indicated by (7), the invasive fish also may be harvested for its economic value. In some 
instances, however, this economic value may be absent due to less desire in the market. With 
a low, or even zero, fish price, 0 v = , the invasive fish is merely a pest, like the jellyfish case  
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in Knowler, Barbier, and Strand (2002) and Knowler and Barbier (2005). Fishing then occurs 
mainly for pest control, but it takes place as a byproduct of fishing for native fish because of 
non-selectivity in harvest. These different cases are analyzed in section 5.  
   
4.2 Recreational fishing   
Besides commercial fishing, there may also be recreational fishing. Indeed, in some instances, 
the recreational fishery is more important. This is the case for the Norwegian Atlantic Salmon 
fishery explored further in this paper (Section 6 below). While the commercial fishing of 
salmon takes place in the fjords and inlets, salmon also is harvested in the rivers during their 
upstream spawning migration in the summer and autumn. The fishing activity in Norwegian 
rivers is almost exclusively recreational in nature, dominated by recreational anglers with 
fishing rods. Each angler purchases a time-restricted fishing permit from a landowner/river 
manager who is authorized by the state to sell fishing permits. A permit may be issued for as 
little as a few hours or as long as a season. The most common permits are issued on a 24-hour 
basis (Olaussen and Skonhoft 2008b).    
 
Most rivers are managed by a single landowner, or a cooperation of landowners, acting as a 
single principal. The willingness to pay for a recreational fishing permit typically decreases in 
the number of permits  (Anderson  1993).  Assuming that the fishing permit  price  t I  also 
depends on  the stock sizes t X  or  t Y ,  an  inverse demand function may be written as 
(, ,) t t tt I IDXY =  and where  t D  is the number of fishing permits, or number of fishing days
4. 
The overall surplus from recreational fishing in the rivers is made up of landowner profits 




t t tt t t U I X Y d zD ξξ =− ∫                               (8) 
when the unit cost of providing fishing permits is fixed by  z .     
 
The permit price declines in the number of fishing permits,  0 D I < . It is assumed to increase 
in the size of the native stock,  0 X I > , as a higher fish stock indicates a higher quality of the 
river (see, e.g., Olaussen and Skonhoft 2008b). The permit price could either increase or 
                                                 
4 The implicit assumption here is that the recreational fishers know the current year’s stocks. Due to stock 
assessments before the fishing season starts (which usually is in mid June) this assumption may not be far too 
unrealistic.   
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decrease in the abundance of escaped farmed fish. It is increasing,  0 Y I > , if the stock size 
available for harvest is all that matters; that is, if the anglers consider a fish as a fish. This may 
be due to preferences or simply to difficulties in distinguishing between escaped farmed and 
native fish. On the other hand, the permit price shifts down with the size of the escaped 
farmed stock if the abundance of escaped farmed salmon decreases the utility of the anglers. 
In this case, the anglers simply prefer to harvest pure natives. See also section 6.1 below.  
 
4.3 Economic effects of invasion 
As in Knowler and Barbier (2000) and Barbier (2001), the economic net effect of an invasion 
is determined by comparing pre- and post-invasion scenarios. That is, the economic effect is 
the difference between the net benefits yielded from harvesting a native fish before and a 
native and a farmed species after invasion. If  0,t π is the net current value  of pre-invasion 
fishing for the commercial fishery, and  0,t U for the recreational fishing, the current invasive 
economic impact Bt may be expressed as:  
, 0, 0, 0, 0, [ ][ ] Ct t t t t t t t t t t B p E X v EY cE p E X cE ππ θ ψ θ = −= + − − −                             (9) 
and    
0,
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
00
[ (, ,) ][ ( , ) ]
t t D D




The management of the ecological system under consideration is analyzed in equilibrium
5. A 
single planner aims to maximize net benefits. We first consider commercial harvest. When 
using the general natural growth functions and omitting the time subscript, the Lagrangian is:  
                          ( ) [ ( , )] [ ( ( , ) )] L p EX v EY cE EX F X Y EY G Y X m θ ψ λθ µψ = + −− − − − +    (11)    
where  0 λ >  and µ  are the shadow prices of the native and farmed species, respectively. 
 
In this problem, harvest effort  E  is the single control variable, and  there are two stock 
variables,  X andY . The first order necessary conditions are:  
                                                 
5 Analyzing dynamic problems where the present value net benefit is maximized are hence left out in the present 
exposition. However, it is well known that the steady state of such problems coincide with the solution of the 
parallel equilibrium fishery problems except for the discount rate; that is, for zero discount rate these solutions 
are similar.    
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/ ( )0 L E pX vY c X Y θ ψ λθ µψ ∂ ∂= + −− + =  ,                             (12) 
[ ] / ( ,) (, ) 0 XX L X pE E F XY G YX θ λθ µ ∂ ∂= − − + = ,                     (13) 
and 
[ ] / ( ,) (, ) 0 YY L Y v E F XY E G YX ψ λ µψ ∂ ∂= + − − = .                      (14) 
Sufficient conditions are discussed in the Appendix. Control condition (12) indicates that 
fishing effort should be increased up to the point where the marginal revenue is equal to the 
marginal costs, which are made up of the effort costs  plus the costs of reduced stocks 
evaluated at their shadow prices. The native fish stock condition (13) states that the number of 
native fish should be maintained so that the value of one more fish on the margin should 
equalize its marginal cost minus the marginal value of an invasive fish, both measured at their 
respective shadow prices. Condition (14) has the same interpretation for the invasive fish. In 
this solution, the coexistence of both species is assumed. It is known that coexistence in a 
competing setting may require that the total value of biomass lost due to competition must not 
be too large (see, e.g., Hannesson 1983 for an economic analysis, and e.g., Maynard Smith 
1974 for a basic ecological discussion). In our model, this means, for example, that there must 
be certain restrictions on the parameters affecting the intensity of the habitat competition as 
well as the size of the annual stream of newly escaped fish (see also numerical section 6 
below).  
 
Rewriting (13) as  ( )/( ) XX pE G E F λ θµ θ = +− it is seen that  0 λ >  when the marginal 
harvest value dominates the invasive stock cost effect 0 X pE G θµ +> because the harvest 
function  EX θ  has to intersect with the native fish natural growth function F from below to 
secure an interior maximum solution (see Appendix). Moreover, rewriting equation (14) as 
( )/( ) YY vE F EG µψλ ψ = +− , it is first observed that ( )0 Y EG ψ −>  also must hold for the 
same reason. We then find that  0 µ ≥  if  Y vE F ψλ ≥− . Therefore, the escaped fish shadow 
price is positive, suggesting that its harvest price v is ‘high’ together with a ‘small’ negative 
effect on the native fish growth; that is,  Y F is small in value. This is the ‘value’ case of the 
escaped fish. In the opposite case, we have a ‘pest’, or ‘nuisance’ situation with a negative 
shadow price,  0 µ < .
6 Irrespective of whether escaped fish are pests or commercially valuable, 
it is always optimal to harvest escaped fish due to the non-selective nature of the fishery. 
                                                 
6 For a similar classification, see Schulz and Skonhoft (1996), Zivin, Hueth and Zilberman (2000) and Horan and 




When the control condition (12) is rewritten as () () p X v Yc λθ µψ − +− = , it is seen that 
( )0 p λ −<  holds when the difference between the market price and the shadow price of the 
invasive fish is ‘large’. Equation (13) written as () ( ) XX p E FG λθ λ µ − = −+  indicates that  X F  
is strictly positive in an optimal program if X G µ  is ‘small’ in value. In this case, for a given 
optimal number of invasive fish, the optimal native stock size will be located to the left hand 
side of  the peak value of the natural growth function, or 
msy X (cf. also Figure 1).  If the 
invasive harvesting price is ‘low’ and  0 µ <  together with ‘low’ fishing cost c , we have 
0 X F >  for  certain.  As demonstrated below (section 6.2) this is  the baseline result in the 
numerical simulations,  contrasting it with  the standard one-species,  Gordon-Schaefer 
equilibrium harvesting model (Clark 1990). On the other hand, a ‘high’ ccombined with a 
‘low’ value of the native fish catchability coefficient θ , we typically end up with a ‘large’ 
optimal native stock and a solution to the right hand side of 
msy X . See the Appendix for 
further discussion.  
 
Next, we consider the recreational fishery. Harvest is still  defined through the Schaefer 
functions  h DX ϕ =  and  q DY ω = where  effort  is  given in number of fishing days, or 
equivalently, number of licences (see above), with ϕ  and ω as the recreational catchability 
coefficient for the native and invasive fish, respectively. Therefore, just as in the commercial 
case,  with equal catchability coefficients, i.e., ϕω = ,  we find that the harvest ratio is 
proportional to the fish abundance ratio. The Lagrangian function now reads:   
0
( , , ) [ ( , )] [ ( ( , ) )]
D
L I X Y d zD DX F X Y DY G Y X m ξ ξ λϕ µω = −− − − − + ∫ .         (15) 
The first-order conditions with coexistence of both species  0 X > ,  0 Y > , and  0 D >  are: 
/ (, ,) ( ) 0 L D IDXY z X Y λϕ µω ∂ ∂= −− + = ,                                          (16) 
0
/ (, ,) [ (,) ] (, ) 0
D
Xx X L X I XYd F XY D G YX ξ ξλ ϕ µ ∂ ∂=+ − + = ∫              (17) 
and 
0
/ (, ,) (,) [ (, ) ]0
D
Y yY L Y I XYd F XY G YX D ξ ξλ µ ω ∂ ∂=+ + − = ∫ .               (18)  
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The interpretations of these conditions are analogous to the commercial equations (12), (13), 
and (14) above and require no further comments. The important  difference is that the 
willingness to pay for fishing permits, and hence the fish price, depends on the stocks of the 
native and invasive fish and the number of permits. Thus, in contrast to  the commercial 
fishery, the price is endogenous in the recreational case. The cost structure is also different as 
there are no direct harvesting costs included in the recreational case. The landowner has a 
fixed unit cost of providing permits, but even in the presence of this fixed cost, condition (16) 
indicates that the landowner’s profit generally is positive; at least when both shadow prices 









Y I XYd ξξ ∫  equal zero, conditions (17) and (18) indicate a 
zero shadow price for the native as well as the invasive stock. As a consequence, condition 
(16) then yields zero landowner profit. Just as in the commercial model, we may end up with 
a native stock located to the right hand side as well as the left hand side of 
msy X . Intuitively, 
the first outcome can occur when the native demand stock value effect is substantial while the 
second may occur if, say, the harvesting catchability coefficient is ‘high’ or the willingness to 
pay for permits is ‘high’. 
 
The first order conditions (16) –  (18) together with the equilibrium conditions 
(,) F X Y DX ϕ =  and  (, ) G Y X m DY ω +=  yield five equations determining the size of the 
two fish stocks, the effort, and the two shadow prices. In addition, the native fish harvest 
follows as  (,) h DX F X Y ϕ = =  and the invasive harvest as  (, ) q DY G Y X m ω = = + . 
Combining these two equilibrium conditions yields  ( , )/( ( , ) ) / F XY GY X m X Y ϕω += . 
Therefore, the effects of the yearly inflow of escaped fish  m  on the fish abundance are 
channeled directly through this composite equilibrium condition. Differentiation now yields 
(1/ )[( / ) ( / ) ] (1/ ){[ ( ) / ] ( / ) } (1/ ) X XY Y X F F X X Y G dX Y G G m Y Y X F dY Y dm ϕ ϕ ω ω ωϕ ω − − − −+ − =
.  (,) FXY is concave in  X at the optimum ( /)0 X F FX −< , and the invasive stock function is 
concave in Y as well, [ ( )/ ] 0 Y G GmY −+ < (see Appendix). Therefore, if the optimal size of 
the escaped fish stock increases with a higher inflow (see Section 6), we find that the native 
stock may also increase when the negative ecological effect from the escaped to the native 
stock  Y F  is ‘small’ in value. On the other hand, the native stock size will, not surprisingly, 
become lower in the new equilibrium with a higher inflow if this ecological effect is ‘large’ in  
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value and the negative ecological effect from the native to the invasive stock  X G is ‘small’ in 
value. Recall that the size of the ecological effects is contingent upon a growth effect and a 
stock effect, and each is affected by two separate parameters in the specific functional form 
(section 3 above). In the numerical section, we demonstrate that these parameters, and hence 
the magnitude of  Y F , have strong effects on the economics of this fishery. Note also that we 
assume the same type of composite equilibrium condition in the commercial fishery (see also 
the Appendix).  
 
A combined commercial and recreational fishery management may also be an option. The net 
benefit of both fisheries together 
0
( ) ( ) [ (, ,) ]
D
U p EX v EY cE I X Y d zD π θψ ξ ξ += + − + − ∫  is 
maximized subject to the ecological constraints. The first order control conditions of this 
problem are: 
/ ( ) 0; L E pX vY c X Y θ ψ λθ µψ ∂ ∂= + −− + ≤   0 E ≥               (19) 
and 
/ ( , , ) ( ) 0; L D IDXY z X Y λϕ µω ∂ ∂= −− + ≤    0 D ≥              (20) 
while the stock conditions  /0 LX ∂∂= and  /0 LY ∂∂= simply add up from the previous two 
separate harvest situations.  
 
If the willingness to pay for recreational fishing is ‘high’ relatively to the commercial market 
fish price, we typically end up with a corner solution with recreational fishing only. That is, 
condition (20) holds as an equation while (19) holds as an inequality due to the Kuhn-Tucker 
theorem. This analysis of a combined fishery tacitly implies that recreational and commercial 
fishing take place simultaneously. In reality, however, there may be sequential fishing (cf. the 
Norwegian Atlantic salmon  fishery considered further in the numerical section). Such a 
scheme complicates the analysis further, as the biological constraints have to be adjusted 
accordingly. In addition, since commercial salmon fishing in Norway is subsistent in nature, 
and the economic value from commercial harvest is almost negligible compared to the values 
from recreational fishing, we typically end up with a corner solution involving recreational 
angling only. Consequently, the sequential harvest model seems superfluous in this specific 
case. Moreover, the models we construct here  are generic in the sense that they  may be 
applicable to other cases, not only salmon. Thus, some fisheries  may be for commercial 
harvest (typically  sea fisheries)  only  and  some may be for recreational fishing (some  
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freshwater fisheries) only. A sequential fishery is not pursued further in this paper (but see 
Olaussen and Skonhoft 2008a).  
 
6. AN EMPIRICAL APPLICATION TO SALMON 
6.1 Data and specific functional forms 
The methodological framework discussed above will be illustrated empirically using the case 
of Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar) for a typical Norwegian salmon river. Atlantic salmon has 
become one of the most successful farmed species, and salmon aquaculture is one of the 
fastest growing food producing sectors in the world. In just over three decades from 1970 to 
2008, farmed salmon production increased from 500 to over 1.5 million tons (FAO 2010). 
Farmed salmon production has exceeded native production worldwide since 1998. In contrast, 
native salmon stocks have declined in most areas, particularly in the North Atlantic. Some 
argue that salmon aquaculture has contributed to this decline because it triggers a reduction in 
the survival of native salmon (e.g., Ford and Myers 2008), the spread of diseases and parasites 
(Bjørn and Finstad  2002;  Gargan, Tully, and Poole 2002; Krkošek  et al.  2006), and 
interbreeding (e.g., Naylor et al. 2005; Hindar et al. 2006). Norway has been the world’s 
number one farmed salmon producer since its beginning. Today, escaped farmed salmon is 
one of the most severe challenges facing the salmon aquaculture industry and native salmon 
stocks (e.g., Esmark, Stensland, and Lilleeng 2005).  
 
Atlantic salmon is an anadromous fish with a complex life cycle. Its spawning and juvenile 
development takes place in freshwater, and it feeds and grows in the sea before returning to its 
natal rivers to spawn.  Native salmon is commonly harvested by two sectors: commercial 
fishing and recreational fishing. Commercial fishermen harvest salmon in the fjords and inlets 
as salmon migrate toward their spawning ground, and recreational anglers target salmon in the 
rivers.  Commercial  harvests are conducted  for meat  value  while recreational fishing is 
conducted by individuals for sport and leisure with the possibility of personal consumption. 
Escaped farmed salmon in the fjords and rivers also are caught by commercial fishermen and 
recreational anglers.  
 
The  inverse demand function in the recreational fishery is  specified  as 
() ( , , ) (1 )
XY I IDXY e D
κϕ ω αη φ
−+ = = +− − . Here  0 α > and  0 φ >  are the standard choke and 
slope parameters, respectively, while  0 η >  and  0 κ > are parameters describing how the size  
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of the fish stock, or river quality, translates into demand and where κ indicates the strength of 
this changing stock demand effect. The stock demand effect is approximated by total catch 
per unit effort (or catch rate), i.e., ( )/ ( )/ ( ) h q D DX DY D X Y ϕ ω ϕω +=+ = + , and where we 
assume  the same quality effect of both native and escaped salmon (see also section 4 above). 
This demand specification implies that when fish abundance is ‘small’, the permit choke price 
approaches α  , and when the fish abundance is ‘high’, it approaches its maximum value 
() αη + .  
 
The baseline values for ecological and economic parameters are  shown  for a typical 
Norwegian river in  Table 1.  As seen from this table, some  of the parameter values are 
calibrated based on general fishing and farming practice in Norway. These values may vary to 
some degree dependent on environmental conditions and practice, and thus  sensitivity 
analyses are presented for the most important parameters. It should also be noted that the 
ecological effects of the escaped on native salmon is assumed to be the same as the effects of 
native on escaped salmon, thus,  a γ =  and  b β = . The catchability coefficient for native and 
farmed salmon are assumed to be identical because there is no evidence that they are different, 
hence  θψ =  and ϕω = . Additionally, the baseline prices for farmed and native are also 
assumed to be equal, pv =  although  native  salmon may command a higher price than 
escaped farmed salmon if appropriately labeled and people are well informed (see results 
section below). The intrinsic growth rates for native and escaped farmed salmon are different. 
Experimental and field research show that farmed and hybrid salmon are competitively and 
reproductively inferior, resulting in lower survival rates and reproductive success than native 
fish, i.e., rs >  (Fleming et al. 1996 & 2000; McGinnity et al. 2003 & 2004). The annual 
inflow of escaped farmed salmon m is directly related to the size of the farmed production in 
the net-pens, farm management practice, and natural conditions, such as the frequency of 
storms and so forth. For these and other reasons, m changes from year to year (see Olaussen 
and Skonhoft 2008 for some evidence). In our analysis, m is assumed constant and may hence 
be interpreted to be an average over a period of years. Its baseline value is set at  400 m = fish. 
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
6.2 Results   
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We first consider a commercial fishery in which the same price is assumed for escaped and 
native  salmon  (Table 1).  The results are shown in Table  2,  which also reports the  pre-
invasion results. For the baseline parameter values the native and farmed salmon coexist with 
the native dominating the ecological system. Further, for the optimal size of the invasive stock, 
the  stock value representing the peak  of the native  stock growth function is  about 
9593
msy X = . Hence, the optimal size of the native stock is located to the left hand side of this 
peak. We find  3 µ = −  (NOK/salmon) and therefore ( ) 53 p µ −= . The native salmon shadow 
value  90 λ =  (NOK/salmon) is quite high.
7 This outcome typically implies a rather large gap 
between the harvesting price of the invasive fish and its shadow value. On the other hand, as 
expected, we find the optimal stock size to be above  /2 12,500
msy XK = =  in the pre-invasive 
case (see also Table 1). While the native stock intrinsic growth rate is 0.26 in the pre-invasive 
situation,  it reduces  marginally  to 
5*7010/5813 ( , ) 0.26*(1 ) 0.259 r rXY e
− = = −=   in the post 
invasive case (section 3 and Table 1). On the other hand, the stock effect given by the term, 
1*5813 5813 Y β = = is about 83% of the optimal native salmon stock (5813/7010). Altogether 
these two effects combined mean that the optimal native stock becomes significantly lower 
than in the pre-invasion case. As a consequence, the native salmon fishery profit declines due 
to the invasive escaped farmed salmon, dropping from NOK 77 (thousand) pre-invasion to 
NOK  40  (thousand).  Nevertheless, the  total  profit  reminds  quite  stable with NOK  73 
(thousand). Therefore, any native salmon profit loss is mostly compensated for by the profits 
attained from harvesting escaped farmed salmon.  
 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
We have looked also at the situation where the escaped salmon harvest price is zero,  0 v = . 
With all the other parameter values unchanged, escaped farmed salmon then has a negative 
shadow price  53 µ = −  and is harvested just as a pest by-product due to the non-selectivity of 
the fishery, and for the benefit of the native salmon stock (section 5 above). The total profit 
now  declines significantly from  NOK  77  (thousand)  to  NOK  40  (thousand)  in this post-
invasion pest case. Therefore, the escaped harvest price gives small and negligible quantum 
effects and the profit reduction is basically related to the missing invasive harvesting value.  
 
                                                 
7 1 NOK =0.168 US$.  
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We turn next to the recreational fishing case. For the baseline parameter values, the native 
stock as well as the invasive stock becomes higher than in the commercial case. Like the 
commercial baseline case, the optimal native stock size is located at the left hand side of 
msy X  
in the post invasion case. As discussed above (section 5), this may typically indicate a rather 
‘high’ permit demand, and/or a ‘high’ recreational fishery catchability coefficient. The results 
reported in Table 3 show that the size of the native stock and its harvest decrease by more 
than 50% after the invasion. However, the total harvest and surplus are kept relatively stable 
as the total stock size just slightly changes.  The relatively stable total stock size also leads to 
small differences in permit prices and fishing days between pre- and post-invasion since the 
native and escaped salmon are treated equally in the demand function.  
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
For the given ecological parameter values and the fixed annual inflow of escaped farmed 
salmon, the above results suggest that the ecological and economic effects of escaped farmed 
salmon on native salmon are substantial, i.e.,  Y F  is ‘large’ in value. As a consequence, the 
harvest and profit of native salmon decline  after escaped farmed salmon enter the 
environment. Escaped farmed salmon yield supplementary harvests and profit and surplus to 
fishermen and anglers, however. These supplements compensate in whole or in part the losses 
of native salmon harvests. This highlights an important feature of escaped farmed salmon. 
Since it contributes to the stock available for harvest, the incentives among fishermen, anglers 
and landowners to reduce escaped farmed fish may be weak. For these reasons, the potential 
long term negative impacts through ecological mechanisms could be neglected by the various 
stakeholders.  
 
Salmon is at present harvested by both commercial and recreational fishing sectors in Norway. 
Due to the high total surplus generated by the recreational fishery, however, our results yield a 
corner solution where the whole stock is destined for recational fishing, i.e.,  0 E = and  0 D >  
as the optimal solution. See conditions (19) and (20) (Section 5). Thus, the mixed fishing case 
is not considered here. 
 
6.3 Sensitivity analysis   
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The robustness of the results due to changes in some key ecological and economic parameters 
are tested. Since recreational fishing generates higher economic surplus, this seems to be the 
more interesting fishery, and we hence use this fishery to demonstrate these effects. We start 
to look at changes in the annual inflow of escaped salmon, m, where we used 400 salmon in 
the baseline scenario, see Figure 2. Such changes may be related to various reasons (see 
section 6.1 above). We find that the equilibrium native and farmed stocks and harvests change 
dramatically with a shifting annual inflow of escaped farmed salmon (upper panel). When 
0 m = , the native stock becomes dominant because of its higher intrinsic growth rate while 
the escaped farmed fish disappear. On the other hand, with  600 m =  the native stock goes 
extinct, and only farmed salmon remains. Therefore, for that high value of inflow, the native 
stock is simply outcompeted. See section 5 above, but also the last part of the Appendix 
where the effect of m  can be seen under simplified assumption. The angler surplus changes 
slightly while the total profit virtually reminds at the same level except a small decline when 
600 m =  (lower panel). These results are related to the fairly steady permit price and the 
number of fishing days 
 
Insert Figure 2 here 
 
We next study changes in the parameters β and b which steer the intensity of the habitat 
competition  between  the  native  and  escaped farmed salmon.  A higher β  indicates that 
escaped farmed salmon has a stronger negative stock effect on native salmon, i.e.  Y F increases 
in value (see Section 3), while a higher value of b works in a similar manner on farmed 
salmon. The results in Table 4 where both these parameters are shifted simultaneously show 
that the biomass loss to competition increases, and the optimal native salmon stock declines 
rapidly with increasing stock competition (cf. also section 5 above). When  1.2 β = , the stocks 
no longer coexist; the native salmon goes extinct and only the farmed salmon remains. This 
occurs irrespective of the significant higher native salmon intrinsic growth rate, and is mainly 
due to the annual inflow of escaped farmed salmon. The numbers of fishing days and the 
permit price are strongly influenced as well. As a consequence, the total surplus and benefit 
distribution change. For example, when changing β  and b from the baseline value of 1 to 1.2, 
the total surplus declines from NOK 2332 to NOK 2067 (thousand) while the landowner 
profit increases from NOK 430 (thousand) to NOK 639 (thousand). The lower number of 




Insert Table 4 here 
 
The effects of changing the  intrinsic growth  rates  are  also studied.  Keeping the intrinsic 
growth rate of native salmon constant, we change the intrinsic growth rate of farmed salmon. 
When s becomes smaller, the stock size of native salmon increases while the stock size of 
farmed salmon decreases. The total stock size also reduces with a lower value of s. As a 
consequence, we find lower permit prices and more fishing days. Therefore, angler surplus 
increases and landowner profit decreases whereas the total surplus decreases. If sgradually 
increases, the stock size of native salmon decreases while the stock size of escaped farmed 
salmon increases. When s approaches r , the escaped farmed salmon gradually replace native 
salmon which disappears eventually,  analogous to what has been observed for  crayfish 
(Kataria 2007). 
 
Changes in the choke price α  are also considered. Shifts here may be attributed to changing 
income conditions of the anglers as well as changing preferences for recreational fishing. 
Table 5 indicates that both the optimal size of native and escaped salmon stocks respond 
rapidly to changing demand conditions while the total harvest and profit are enhanced as the 
increasing reservation price implies a higher demand.  
 
Insert Table 5 here 
 
Finally we studied the effects of shifts in the recreational fishery catchability coefficients ϕ  
and ω  (not reported, but available upon request). Such shifts may be related to changes in 
gear restrictions and gear use (fly fishing, fishing lure, spinning bait). When the catchability 
coefficient increases from its baseline value to a higher value, we find, not surprisingly, lower 
stock sizes both of the escaped farmed and the native salmon, and higher harvest and total 
surplus. The fishing effort in number of fishing days changes slightly, and the combined 
effects of smaller stocks and higher catchability coefficient yield a higher fishing price. As a 
consequence, we find increased  landowner  profit  while angler surplus remains  almost 
unchanged. The more or less unchanged value of the angler surplus is due to a two sided 
effect (section 5 and 6.1 above). On the one hand, more efficient technology means smaller  
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stocks  which shift  the demand function inwards through the stock sizes in the demand 
function. This effect is, however, neutralized through the catch per effort stock effect.  
 
In sum, changes in the annual inflow of escaped farmed salmon, m, and changes in the habitat 
competition parametersβ and b  yield the strongest effects on the stock sizes of native and 
farmed species among the tested parameters. The effects of changing the intrinsic growth rate 
of farmed salmon and of changing the choke price α  are greater on farmed than on native 
salmon. The shifts in the recreational fishery catchability coefficients ϕ  and ω  have similar 
effect on both native and farmed species.  
 
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We develop a general invasion impact model capturing both ecological and economic effects 
of invasive fish on native fish. More specially, we model the effects of an escaped farmed fish 
on  native fish. Ecologically, two effects, namely growth and stock, are specified and 
incorporated into the logistic growth functions of native and escaped fish. Both lower the 
natural growth. Economically, the benefit  associated with native and escaped fish  are 
explored. A native fish is exploited for commercial values, while an escaped farmed fish is 
harvested either for commercial value or as a pest. Two different harvesting models are 
developed, and where the theoretical underpinnings of the commercial fishery as well as the 
recreational fishery  are explored.  Both fisheries take place with nonselective harvesting 
technologies and are analyzed in equilibrium only. A case study of Atlantic salmon in Norway 
illustrates the interaction between native and escaped farmed salmon. Sensitivity analyses are 
conducted to test the robustness of the results to changes in some key parameters such as 
yearly inflow of escapees, habitat competition coefficient, intrinsic growth rate, choke price 
and catchability coefficient. Such parameter changes also indicate when coexistence of both 
fish stocks no longer prevails. 
 
As expected, the ecological results are quite dramatic with respect to the stock, growth and 
harvest of native fish. On the other hand, economically it turns out that the total net benefits 
received by fishermen and/or anglers and landowners decline only slightly. In some cases 
they  can  even  be  better off from harvesting both native and farmed species than solely 
catching  native fish.  Benefits  are  transferred from the  salmon aquaculture  industry  to 
fishermen, anglers and landowners. However, the value of such possible benefit transfer is  
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sensitive to the catch valuation of the escaped salmon. In our baseline numerical analysis, it is 
assumed that there is no distinction between native and farmed salmon to anglers. A fish is 
just a fish to them. This might not always be the case, and results from Olaussen and Liu 
(2009)  indicate that anglers are willing to pay substantially  more for fishing  native  than 
farmed salmon. In reality, however, the permit price is still determined based on the total 
stock in the rivers.  
 
As indicated earlier (Section 3), there are some limitations to our analysis. In this paper, 
lumped natural growth functions are used. Thus, the accumulated effects of interbreeding 
between  native  and farmed species  are not explicitly modeled.  The preferred model to 
incorporate such accumulated genetic effects would be an age-structured dynamic model like 
the one developed by Hindar et al. (2006)  which is studied through simulations.  Such  a 
simulation model would require a large amount of parameters and associated values that are 
unavailable in most cases.  For a bioeconomic attempt to model the genetic effects of 
interbreeding, see Guttormsen et al. (2008). Further, the economic analysis includes only the 
market values from harvesting of both escaped and escaped fish. Other values such as the 
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Table 1. Baseline values ecological and economic parameters. 
Sources: Fishbase= www.fishbase.org., OS= Olaussen and Skonhoft (2008a) and NOU= 
NOU (1999). 
* The intrinsic growth rate for farmed salmon is estimated based on reproductive 
traits such as fecundity, survive rate, and generation time (Fleming et al. 1996, 2000&2006; 
McGinnity et al. 2003 & 2004).  












Parameter  Description  Value  Reference 
K  Carrying capacity  25,000 (# of salmon)  Assumed 
r  Intrinsic growth rate, native salmon  0.26  Fishbase 
 s  Intrinsic growth rate, farmed salmon  0.12  Estimated
*  
β  Habitat competition coefficient, native  1   Calibrated 
γ  Scaling factor growth effect, native  5  Calibrated 
b  Habitat competition coefficient, farmed  1  Calibrated 
a  Scaling factor growth effect, farmed  5  Calibrated 
m  Yearly influx escaped farmed salmon  400 (# of salmon)  Calibrated 
θ  Catchability coefficient, native, commercial  0.003 (1/day)  NOU 
ψ  Catchability coefficient, farmed, commercial  0.003 (1/day)  Calibrated 
φ  Catchability coefficient, native, recreational   0.000015(1/day)  OS 
ω  Catchability coefficient, farmed, recreational  0.000015(1/day  Calibrated 
α  Choke price, recreational   500 (NOK/day)  OS 
       ø  Slope effect recreational demand  0.12 (NOK/day
2)  OS 
       p  Price, native salmon, commercial  50 (NOK/salmon)  OS 
       v     Price, farmed salmon, commercial  50 (NOK/salmon)  OS 
       z  Marginal cost, recreational   50 (NOK/day)  OS 
      c  Unit cost, commercial  100 (NOK/day)  NOU 
      η  Recreational demand translation parameter   500 (NOK/day)  Calibrated 
      κ  Recreational quality effect parameter  3.33 (1/salmon)  Calibrated  
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Table 2.  Commercial fishing. Baseline parameter values   
 
  Pre-invasion  Post-invasion  Difference     
Stock size native salmon, X  12833  7010  -5823 (45%)     
Stock size farmed salmon, Y   -  5813  -     
Harvest of native salmon, h   1624  886  -738 (45%)     
Harvest of farmed salmon, q   -  734  -     
Fishing effort, E   42  42  -     
Profit of native salmon (‘000 NOK)  77  40  -37 (48%)     










Table 3. Recreational fishing. Baseline parameter values 
 
  Pre-invasion  Post-invasion  Difference         
Stock size native salmon, X    17136  7870  -9266 (-54%)         
Stock size farmed salmon, Y   -  9118  -         
Harvest of native salmon, h   1401  647  -647(-54%)         
Harvest of farmed salmon, q   -  750  -         
Permit price, I (NOK/day)   133  128  -5 (4%)-         
Fishing days, D   5452  5481  29 (0.5%)-         
Angler surplus (‘000 NOK)  1784  1802  18 (1%)-         
Landowner profit (‘000 NOK)   455  430  --25 (5%)         











Table 4. Recreational fishing. Effects of changed habitat competition coefficientβ  and b . 
Baseline values  1 b β = = . 
 
   0.5 b β = =   0.8 b β = =   1 b β = =     1.1 b β = =   1.2 b β = =  
Stock size native salmon, X   11965  9750  7870    6387  0 
Stock size farmed salmon, Y   9772  9067  9118    9208  15226 
Harvest of native salmon, h    1012  807  647    546  0 
Harvest of farmed salmon, q   826  751  750    787  1114 
Permit price, I (NOK/day)  155  143  128    87  181 
Fishing days, D   5638  5519  5481    5670  4879 
Angler surplus (‘000 NOK)  1907  1827  1802    1949  1428 
Landowner profit (‘000 NOK)  591  511  430    210  639 








  α =400  α =500  α =600  α =800   
Stock size native salmon, X   7348  7870  8013  7695 
Stock size farmed salmon, Y   10390  9118  8127  6705 
Harvest of native, h   539  647  733  846 
Harvest of farmed, q   762  750  743  737 
Permit price, I (NOK/day)   107  128  145  178 
Fishing days, D   4889  5481  6099  7325 
Angler surplus (‘000 NOK)  1434  1802  2232  3220 
Landowner profit (‘000 NOK)  281  430  580  935 









Figure 1. The growth and stock effects of escapees on the native stock growth. 
Legend: light solid curve represents the growth without any effects; dark solid curve 
represents growth effect; dotted curve represents stock effect and dashed curve represents 
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Figure 2. Recreational fishing. Effects of different yearly influx of farmed escapees m . Upper 

































As indicated by Figure 1, we may have a potentially  non-concavity  problem in our 
optimization as the native fish growth function  (,) FXYis not concave for ‘small’ values of X . 
This is due to the growth effect. We have also the same situation for  (, ) GY X when Y is ‘small’.  
In this Appendix, we first look at the sufficient conditions for an interior maximum solution in 
the commercial harvesting case. Similar results can be established for recreational fishing. We 
now consider our problem as an unconstrained optimization problem. When substituting away 
the effort use,  the profit function in the commercial harvesting case can  be written as: 
(,)
( , ) (,) [ (,) ]
cFxy














22 2 / ( / ) (2 / )( / ) XX XX XX X X p cX F v G cXF X F ππ θ θ ∂ ∂= =− + − − ,
( /) YY YY YY vG p c X F πθ = +−  and
2 ( /) / XY YX XY XY Y p c X F vG cF X ππ θ θ = = − ++  .  
 
An interior maximum point requires  0 XX π < ,  0 YY π <  and the determinant of the Hessian 
positive, det 0 Η> . 0 XX π < for sure if the solution is found on the concave parts of the natural 
growth functions and if  XX vG is negative, or small in value.  YY π is also negative for sure if 
YY F is negative or small  in value. The signing of detΗ is messy. However, if we assume small, 
and negligible harvesting costs,  0 c ≈ , it simplifies to  
det 
22 2 [ ( )] ( ) xx yy xx yy xx yy yy xx xy xy p F F v G G vp F G F G pF vG Η= + + + − + which is for sure positive 
on the concave parts of the natural growth functions and if the bracket term [..] dominates the 
last term. Under these conditions the internal solution  /0 X π ∂ ∂= and  /0 Y π ∂ ∂= is a 
maximum point. With somewhat limited success, we have hence been able to say something 
about the sufficient conditions. However, in the numerical illustrations it is demonstrated that 
the solution is found on the concave part of the natural growth functions, and that this solution 
represents a maximum point (figures showing this is available upon request from the authors). 
 
An explicit solution  
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The commercial fishery model may be solved explicitly under some certain simplifications, 
and where we assume coexistence of both stocks. First, it is assumed that the intrinsic growth 
rates are independent of the species composition and hence fixed, i.e., rr =  and ss =  . These 
assumptions are reasonable approximations if γ and aare ‘large’ (Equations 3 and 4). We 
will have the same if they are ‘moderate’, but the optimal species values  X and Y do not vary 
too much. Next, the stock competition effect is assumed to be identical and equal to one, 
1 b β = = . When also inserting for the catch functions, the growth equations (5) and (6) in 
equilibrium  then read  [1 ( ) / ] rX X Y K EX θ −+ = and  [1 ( ) / ] sY Y X K EY m ψ −+ = − , 
respectively.  With  0 X > , we first find ( ) (1 / ) X Y K Er θ += −  which substituted into the 
escaped fish equilibrium equation yields  / sY E r EY m θψ = − . The size of the escaped stock 
reads / ( /) Y mE s r ψθ = − while the native stock follows as 
( 1 /) / ( /) ( 1 /) X K Er mE s r K Er Y θ ψθ θ = −− − = −− . When inserted into the profit function 
(7), we find  [( 1 /) / ( /) ] [ / ( /) ] pE K Er mE s r vE mE s r c E π θ θ ψθ ψ ψθ = −− −+ −− . 
Differentiating  yields  / (1 2 / ) 0 d dE p K E r c π θθ = − −=  and 
22 /0 d dE π < . Therefore, the 
profit maximizing effort is fixed  by ( / 2 )(1 / ) E r c pK θθ = −.  Notice that under these 
simplified assumptions, the optimal effort use is independent of the escaped fish harvesting 
price. In a next step, we find the number of fish as: 
(a1)  (1/ 2 / 2 ) 2 / (1 / )( ) X K c pK m c pK r s θ θ θ ψθ = + −− −  
and 
(a2)  2 / (1 / )( ) Y m c pK r s θ θ ψθ = −− . 
The total stock is therefore ( 1/2 /2 ) X Y K c pK θ += + . With costless harvesting  0 c = , the 
stocks simplify to  /2 2 /( ) XK mr s θ ψθ = −− and  2 /( ) Y mr s θ ψθ = − . The total number of 
fish is then simply /2 XYK += .  
 
Notice that the above solution is valid only for  0 X > . Under this assumption,  0 m = hence 
implies  0 Y = . With 0 m = , but both  0 X > and 0 Y > , the stock equilibrium conditions write 
( ) (1 / ) X Y K Er θ += − and ( ) (1 / ) X Y K Es ψ += − . These equations only hold if  // rs θψ = . 
Therefore,  both stocks can not coexist  ( 0 X > and 0 Y > )  when  0 m = under the given 
assumptions ( 1 b β = = ) and similar stock competition effects.  
 
We then consider the recreational fishery. When inserting for the specified inverse demand 
function (section 6.1), the total surplus function  (8) may first be written as  
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() [ (1 ) / 2]
XY U e D D zD
κϕ ω αη φ
−+ = +− − − . Under the same simplifying assumptions as above 
and with 0 X > , the equilibrium stock sizes read / ( /) Y mD s r ωϕ = − and 
( 1 /) / ( /) XK D rm D sr ϕ ωϕ = −− − . Combining yields then 
[ ( 1 /)( ) / ( /) ] [ (1 ) / 2]
K Dr mD s r U e D D zD
κϕ ϕ ϕω ω ϕ αη φ
− − −− − = +− − −.  In this case, however, it is not 
possible to find explicit expressions for the optimal effort use (number of fishing days) and 
therefore neither the optimal stock sizes.  